Journal of Modern Literature in Chinese 現代中文文學學報
Volume 6
Issue 2 Vol. 6.2 & 7.1 六卷二期及七卷一期
(2005)

Article 7

6-1-2005

Whose nation? Ethnographic enquiry in cultural discourses of
belonging since the 80s = 誰的家國? 從民族誌角度看八十年代以
來有關認同問題的文化論述
Andrea RIEMENSCHNITTER
Universität Zürich

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/jmlc

Recommended Citation
Riemenschnitter, A. (2005). Whose nation? Ethnographic enquiry in cultural discourses of belonging since
the 80s = 誰的家國? 從民族誌角度看八十年代以來有關認同問題的文化論述. Journal of Modern Literature
in Chinese, 6.2&7.1, 79-93.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Humanities Research 人文學科研究中心 at
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Modern Literature in
Chinese 現代中文文學學報 by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Whose Nation? Ethnographic Enquiry in
Cultural Discourses of Belonging Since the 80s
誰 的 家 國 ？從民族詖角度看八十年代以來有關認同問題的文化論述
79

Tibet, in Zhaxi Dawa's hands, permanently defies all hermeneutic efforts, because
it is an endless enigma, an eternal mystery.
Wang Fei1

The Spectre of Minority Discourse
Concepts of culture, in our contemporary globalizing world, very often stress the
idea of boundaries. It looks as if, wkh an increasing facilitation of traffic and communication across geographical boundaries and the rapidly growing knowledge about
our distant others， traditional imaginary distinctions are not only far from experiencing a natural devaluation, but, on the contrary, also resurfacing with an ever stronger
intensity. This paradoxical development is currently being scrutinized by a number
of academic scholars as well as cultural critics, and at the same time being explored
aesthetically by many producers in the cultural field. Race, time and location have
become key notions in revisionist reconstructions of a world history that is perceived
1 Wang Fei 王緋, "Mohuan yu huangdan: zuan zai Zhaxi Dawa shouxinr li de Xizang11魔幻與荒誕:攥在扎西達娃
手心兒裡的西藏[Magic and Fantastic: Reprinting the Tibet in the Palm of Zhaxi Dawa], 久/za叩, y/nm/su/j/L/e 西
藏，
隱秘歲月[T/bef, 77ieH/_den C /roi/c]， by Zhaxi Dawa (Wuhan: Chang jiang chu ban she, 1993) 387-99,

to consist o f not one, but several different, interacting local and transnational
modernities. Frank Dikotter has drawn our attention to the importance of the concept
of race since the earliest configurations of Chinese nationalism.2 Benedict Anderson,
in his study of nationalism as a pseudo-religious ideology based on a certain (flexible)
grand narrative that is revered by all or the majority of those people who consider
themselves as members of one community, has argued that nation-building mainly
rests upon the successful integration of changing perceptions of reality by means of
creative historical representation. Along with Ernest Renan3he is convinced that much
depends on a persuasive choice of things to remember and things to forget — the
spookiness, or spectrality, of which principle he indicated by concluding his foreword
to the German edition of his monograph with the perplexing date of "Halloween 1987".4
Jan Assmann, in his study of the formation o f concepts of collective identity in the
early civilizations of Egypt, Israel and Greece, has demonstrated how communities
develop and canonize certain tropes of self-description according to recurring patterns
in their historical experience. The Jewish trope of the exodus, that was formed be
tween 722 BCE and 70 CE as a result of six successive situations of schism and
deportation, illustrates well how individual memories have to go through a long pro
cess of spatialization, de~individualization, forgetting, and continuous narration in order
to become a constitutive part of the community's cultural memory.5 Homi Bhabha
argues for a dynamic inclusion of the displaced, or forgotten histories of nations. His
distinction between two contesting temporalities in the narrative production of the
nation, namely the ,rcontinuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the
repetitious， recursive strategy of the performative,'， has made us aware of a ”concep_
tual ambivalence of modern society/' which is a source of anxiety to the subjects be
cause it seemingly engenders a continuous, fundamental threat of disintegration.6
2 "Race and nation overlapped in the term m/nzu 民族, The constant juxtaposition of g ⑷國 , 'country,' to
叩
種, ’race,1 in set phrases like ’love th e 「ace and love the country’
愛種愛國[sic]), 〇「 ’national
tomdaries and racial bomdaries' (pu 〇
y/e才〇
ng‘/e 國界種界[sic]) also contributed to the integration of the
of race into the nationalist vision. The guo, as one nationalist explained, was not merely a geographical expression:
it had a racial connotation, Even Yan Fu 嚴復 publicly declared that 'the sentiment of patriotism is rooted in racial
nature.'" See Frank Dikotter, The Discourse o f Race in Modern China (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1992)
108-110.
3 Ernest Renan, "Qu'est~ce qu'une nation ? f, [What is a Nation ?], CEuvres Comp/etes de Ernest denari, vol,1
(Paris; Calmann-Levy, 1947-61) 887-906.
4 Benedict Anderson, Die Erf'indung der Nation. Zur Karriere dries foigenreichen Konzepts [Imagined Communities]
(New York: Campus, 1996) 10.
5 Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedachtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung undpoiitische Identitat in fruhen Hochkulturen [Cultural
Memory. Script, Recollection and Political Identities in Early High Cultures] (Munchen: Beck, 1999) 200 f,

Minority discourses， as decisive parts of the performative process of nation-building，
reveal best that
[the] problem is not simply the "selfhood" of the nation as opposed to the otherness of
other nations. We are confronted with the nation split within itself, articulating the
heterogeneity of its population. The barred Nation It/Sel£ alienated from its eternal
self-generation, becomes a liminal signifying space that is internally marked by the
discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories o f contending peoples, antagonis
tic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference.67
While Ulrich Beck only recently has stressed the fundamental threat to territorial
concepts of identity that emanate from cultural difference writ large by the emergent
libidinal forces of globalization,8Bhabha more optimistically asks questions about the
practical and theoretical implications of unsubdued minority discourses. His attitude
points to newness as a chance, as well as a demand, for contemporary nations to thor
oughly revise their outdated categories o f social order. An open acknowledgment of
internal cultural differences with the ensuing reconfigurations of cultural and politi
cal forms of authority according to him does not necessarily threaten, but possibly
empowers collective identities. There is a colourful side to spectres, which he believes
to be enacted in progressive cultural production.
Proceeding from the above-mentioned assumptions about how historically grown
concepts of collective selfhood can predetermine a community's attitude towards cul
tural change, I aim to trace, in a preliminary survey of ethnographic approaches in
films and fiction of Chinese storytellers since the mid-80s, a revisionist discourse of
cultural identity that effectively undertakes to negotiate between persistent traditional
distinctions and modern boundary transgressions. If the above-cited literary critic Wang
Fei's well-intended effort to erase the predominance of atavistic mythologies and reli
gions in Zhaxi Dawa's Tibetan tales, which in my view are employed as the determin
ing constituents of a vexed local modernity, lastly comes to a dead end in his conclusion about the eternally mysterious character of that specific ethnic other, this might
be due to a rather limited perspective. I will argue that Zhaxi Dawa's tales, once posi
6 Homi Bhabha, The Location o f Culture (London, New York: Routledge, 1994) 145 f.
7 Ibid, 148f.
8 Ulrich Beck, f,Das Eigene, das Fremde und die Kommunikationsstrome. Identitaten im Zeitalter der
Informationsgeseilschaf11[丁
he Own, the Alien and Communication Streams. Identities in the Age of the Information
Society], NeueZurcherZeitung [NewZurich Newspaper] nr. 261,11 October 2 003 :2 7 .

tioned within both global cultural theories and a variety of local representations of
ethnic 一 or rural — otherness, reveal a potential of innovation that rests not on mod
ernist exclusion, but on a self-conscious employment of archaic symbolism as a neces
sary epistemic tool. In accordance with Homi Bhabha's observation concerning the
ambivalent coexistence of both pedagogical and performative signifying strategies,
the return to such anachronistic narrative strategies can be explained as supporting
the authors' efforts to give a voice to their community's muted, subalternized subjects,
and thereby establish new forms of transcultural communication. From this poetic
strategy, the vision of a new world order — utopian yet distinctly not radical — can
be derived.

Functions of the Ethnic 〇the「 in Historical and Contemporary Communities
Ethnographic description of the strange peoples at the kingdom's, or empire's,
margins traditionally was the task of religious specialists, and later the bureaucratic
elite. While we still do not and probably will never know a lot about how much of the
oldest descriptions of the territorial peripheries and their respective populations was
based on what kinds of cultural contact, we meanwhile did gain some clearer ideas
about the organization, functions and rationalizing strategies of early cosmographic
anomaly accounts.9While natural manifestations of the divine were believed predomi
nantly to dwell in hidden spaces at the margins of, or beyond, the settled territory, the
settling communities defined themselves by means o f a paradigm of cultural
superiority, that is, by measurement of the political centre's distance from the surrounding "barbarians” with their unrefined cultural practices. The raw and the cooked，
the naked man-eater with dishevelled hair versus the well-mannered gentleman, such
kind of cultural identity construction in binomic oppositions is far from being unique
to the Chinese civilization. Therefore, it is all the more interesting to investigate the
geohistorical effects of such basic anthropological categories— effects, which, in con
trast to the basic categories of cultural identity, are more locally specific. In the Chi
nese case, the idea of a loose control over, and support for the maintenance of social
order in the neighbouring communities, was based on the imperial tribute system.10
Until the takeover of the Qing, there was little appetite for marvellous possessions like
9 Robert F. Campany, Strange Writing: Anomaly Accounts in Early Medieval China (New York; State University of
New York Press, 1992).
10 For quick reference, see the internet history course by Marilyn Levine and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Unit
3: The Chinese System of Tribute," China in the Twentieth Century ZS December Z003 < http://vwvw.lcsc.edu/
modernchina/directory.htin>. The list of publications is still under construction,

in the Western imperialist appropriation of ethnic others, which had legitimated its
violence by means of Christian universalism.11 A clash of civilizations,12 which hap
pened after the Ming-Qing transition, as Western merchants and missionaries started
to establish their business along the Chinese coast， has done great harm to 仕le development of rational concepts of alterity, leading to long-lived negative stereotypes based
on mutual resentment. After the postcolonialist shift of paradigm, while we are cor
recting the outdated vernaculars of ourselves and the various alterities out there in
academic debates, our common conception of Chinese society is still disturbed by the
cliche of a centralized, homogenous and static entity stemming from nineteenth cen
tury literary orientalism.
It would of course at present appear more than premature to outline the role and
importance of past forms of minority discourses, oral histories, and related phenom
ena of secession, decentralization and fragmentation in Chinese history. However, some
scattered observations might give an idea about the multifunctionality of dynastic
concepts of alterity. From the perspective of the empire's approaches to its border
populations， empirical cultural difference was not an object of serious inquiry until
quite late. Likewise, the centre's homogenizing efforts usually did not reach very far.
No matter, whether a basically Daoist project o f tributary accumulation of strange
objects that held them as representatives of the world's magic powers in antiquity, or
a Confucian civilizing project that was enacted as punitive dissemination of degraded
officials to the empire's peripheries’ are taken into account’ it can safely be said that
there was encouragement, but certainly no urge to assimilate or Han-ify the alien
cultures. While， up to the Ming, Daoist missionaries would occasionally contribute to
the empire's glory by making acolytes among the minority peoples in remote moun
tain areas, influential (post-Confucian?) members of the late Ming gentry conversely
began to investigate the geographies and histories of the borderlands in terms of their
moral superiority over a political centre that was seen by them as totally dysfunctional
and degenerate. For the sake of cosmological balance, they travelled to the margins in
order to save and accumulate the moral power from out there.13
Since the formation of a modern nation-state, an urge to fully integrate the vari11 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions. The Wonder o f the New World (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992),
12 Samuel R Huntington, The Clash o f CiviUzations and the Remaking o f World Order (New York: Touchstone,
1997).
13 I have attempted a detailed analysis of the late Ming discourse on travel, boundaries and moral landscape
elsewhere. See Andrea Riemenschnitter, "Traveler's Vocation: Xu Xiake and his Excursion to the Southwestern
Frontier," Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History, eds, Nicola Di Cosmo
and Don Wyatt (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003) 286-323,

ous hinterland communities and minority peoples by means of cultural Han-ification14
has been felt strongly by representatives of political as well as intellectual elites. Think
ers of both the modernist and conservative factions competed in their attempts to
build a new homogenous cultural imaginary that could be implemented as the founda
tion of a Chinese nation. A discourse of race was derived from, among other sources,
the Western historical, anthropological and economic literature that was translated
into Chinese during the late 19th century and up to the contemporary period.15 In his
influential series of lectures Sanmin zhuyi

( The Three Principles o f the

P eople) (1897-1920), Sun Yat-sen classified the population as belonging to five ethnic
groups, namely, the Han majority and the Man

(Manzhu), M eng f t (Mongol), Hui

(Muslim) and Zang ^ (Tibetan) minorities. By inventing a simple pattern of five
national families, he hoped to create a sense of belonging from Han down to the most
isolated tribal communities. Maoism, in accordance with the Marxist principle of privi
leging the historical agency of the nation's subaltern subjects, first encouraged the
cultivation of tribal traditions, but later adopted Sun's guidelines and denounced minority beliefs and customs as backward, superstitious and reactionary. By making use
of the signs of woman， child and the senile， the minorities usually were represented by
the Communist Party's chief ideologues as awaiting Han civilization in the three re
spective discursive frames of the sexual, the pedagogical and the historical.16
Today, among international ethnographers who show an interest in the dialogue
between majority and minority cultures, four different categories of contemporary
Chinese perceptions of ethnic alterity are considered most relevant，
namely， the exoticfemale-primitive, the exotic-familiar, the rebellious and the emerging self-confident
native. The state still profits from maintaining Republican-Marxist images of the eth
nic other as colourfully exotic, female and primitive. After the Maoist agenda of revo
lutionary salvation had run its course, this same concept later served as both a disciplining and deficiency-compensating model towards Han subjects,17and advertisement
for a major national attraction to be sold to foreign tourists.18Popular images about the
14 See Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories," Rethinking American History in
a Global Age ed, Thomas Bender (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992); and Rescuing
History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives o f Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),
15 Frank Dikotter, The Discourse o f Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992),
16 For a good survey of bibliographical references for the history and politics of representation of Chinese minorities
see Ch/呢se Waf/bra/ 加/’c M ‘即"f/es Proyramme, 2001, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Hawaii, 16
August 2004 < http://chinesestudies.hawaii.edu/minorities/library.php>,
17 Dru Gladney "Representing Nationality in China; Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities," 10 April 2003 <vwwv,
hawaii/dru/exotic.htm>.

underdeveloped rural hinterland communities include the trope of sinaojin
(the dead brains) for the exotic familiarity of peasants who failed to accmnulate wealth
in response to the Party's capitalist campaigns,1
19 and (the fear of) tribal insurgency.20
8
During a period of unprecedented financial as well as ideological support brought
about by emergent transnational historical forces like NGOs, tourism and migration,
the Tibetan and several other privileged ethnic communities have begun to self-confidently engage in a genuine dialogue with Han as well as other modern cultures.21Traces
of this emergent phenomenon of speaking and writing back have been noticed and
positively responded to by the zhiqing ^

(young intellectual) generation of Han

producers in the cultural field.

The Cultural Turn of the 80s
On account of their own biographical experience of precarious subalternization
during the radical Maoist years, these members of the Han intelligentsia had several
good reasons to radically question the Party's signifying strategy of the minorities as
female, exotic others of the Han self. Writers as well as filmmakers who as zhiqinghad
been sent into the wilderness to learn from the peasants did not fail to see the parallels
between their own compulsory distant journeys and the former imperial politics of
banishment of officials too outspokenly critical. Thus, returning from their various
countryside abodes, the banned urban youth realized how little newness was in Maoist
revolutionary politics.22 When they were finally allowed to return to the cities, the tra
ditional discourse of ethnic otherness took on a new twist with the so-called xun^en
•尋 根 運 動 (search for roots movement). In order to mend the damage inflicted
by the Maoist invention of a new culture, they made efforts to unearth the vitality of
18 Todd Munson, "Selling China: www,cnta.com and Cultural Nationalism/' 10 April 2003 <v^vwa!banyedu/jmmh/
vol2no1/chinaweb.html>,
19 Liu Xin, in One's Own Shadow: An Ethnographic Account o f the Condition o f Post-Reform Rural China (Berkeley;
University of California Press, 2000),
20 Susuan Blum and Lionel Jensen, eds. China Off Center. Mapping the Margins o f the Middle Kingdom (Honolulu;
University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
21 Stevan Harrell Ways o f Being Ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, Z001).
22 The Chinese director Chen Kaige has once said: "Many would say the Cultural Revolution has destroyed Chinese
culture since numerous cultural relics were destroyed. However, intellectually, it was more a time when the values
inherent in traditional Chinese culture were carried to a dangerous extreme. This was violently reflected in the
behaviour of every individual — from their blind worship of the leader/emperor figure to the total desecration and
condemnation of individual rights, These are mere repetitions of tradition." Quoted in Rey Chow, Primitive Passions.
Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995)

regional， historically grown cultures by reinscribing the official discourse of backward otherness with their own stories about poor hinterland peasants, members of
ethnic minorities or abused women in terms of subalternized subjects as us, not them.
Set up against the revolutionary grand narratives of landlord exploitation or red army
sacrificial victories as well as the derivative romanticism or abstract experimentalism
of earlier urban modernists, and inspired by the magical realism of G.G. Marquez,
these tales explored the particular characteristics of Chinafs different regional cultures,
including local myths, folktales, customs and beliefs. They also searched for a new
form of nation-building based on a reformed, positive value system that would mirror
a liberal acknowledgment of the nation's suppressed or forgotten traditions and the
vigour of peoples used to enduring extreme hardships.
Among other early examples like Laojing^： ^- (Old Well) (1987), Haizi wang^M,
子 王 (ffing o f fte CMdreu) (1987), and Hong
the co-production

■紅高粱 CRec/

(1987)，

tudi 黃 土 地 （
Yel/owE'ar比）（
1984) by Chen Kaige 陳 觀 歌 as

director-actor and Zhang Yimou 張藝謀 as cinematographer reflects a new approach
to art as critical intervention into the nation's grand narratives that previously had
been built on an ideological agenda without much, if any, interest in the particular
local realities. The criticism was all the more persuasive as it was uttered by zhiqing
representatives who had been out there long enough to know about the difference. The
film contrasts the fantastic tales and enthusiastic feasts of singing and dancing from
the revolutionary centre Yan’an 延 安 with the down-to-earth， disconsolate songs and
epics as well as the sinister marriage rites of one of China's poorest peasant regions.
The main protagonists — a red army soldier, who functions as both story collector
and storyteller, and a young peasant girl， who wants to sing and dance at Yan’an instead of getting married to an old villager — are positioned in this scenario as seduced
believers who share a dream of worldly paradise until reality tragically proves its very
impossibility. The soldier, the peasant girl and her little brother embody the national
hope for a better future, but as the adult agents both fail, only the little boy temporarily
disrupts the film's atmosphere of total disenchantment. In the final sequence, he is2
4
3
23 For a more sophisticated theoretical engagement with the film's messages see Chow, Primitive Passions. Visuality,
Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema 79-107.
24 Yomi Braester gives a summary of critical positions and an in-depth reading of Yu Hua 余華’s fictional engagement
with the various, contesting theories of historical time and aesthetic concepts of the past in the framework of
xungen revisionism. See Braester, "The Aesthetics and Anesthetics of Memory: PRC Avant-Garde Fiction," Witness
Against Histofy, Literature, Film, and Public Discourse in Twentieth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2003) 177-191. However, as will be tackled in the following, I disagree with his standard periodization of
xungen production as limited to only one decade (ca. 1985-1995),

shown to be engaged in a lonely and desperate struggle against the overpowering
stream of a shamanistic rain-making procession in order to meet the soldier, who is

returning too late to save the girl's life.23
Leading observers have located the essence of the cultural turn of the mid-80s in
a profound criticism of the manufactured， isolated revolutionary cultural production
and a simultaneous endeavour to catch up with global aesthetic trends as a moderniz
ing strategy. However, both aims do not fully explain the vivid interest in China's
ancient regional cultures of

novelists as well as filmmakers.24 What， among

others, Rey Chow has identified as anti-modernist aesthetic primitivism, and the politi
cal establishment for some time watched unamusedly as a seemingly reactionary trend,
can indeed be seen as the formative stage of a large-scale intellectual reorientation
towards a democratic integration of all subjects into the cultural imaginary of the
nation. While revolutionary as well as early post-Maoist conceptions of culture were
critically focused on aspects of rigid control and terror, the authors of search-for-roots
tales gradually opened a perspective on its complementary dynamic and empowering
aspects. The possibility of new ideas about social change, which according to Western
hermeneutical theories can be anticipated and experimentally enacted in the world of
fiction and arts,25 seems to have been perceived by the post-Maoist generation of cul
tural producers as a chance to limit the terror of macrosocial mismanagement based
on empty ideological speculations of the communist type. In films like Yellow Earth,
Old Well, K ing o f the Children, and Red Sorghum, members of the educated urban
youth are configured as either rooted in’ or at least assimilated to the countryside, with
a more or less clear mission to assist the peasants in their construction of, or adapta
tion to one common and unilinear future. There still remains, therefore, a pedagogical
distance that marks a boundary line between he who knows and teaches and those
who are being taught. However, this line was rapidly torn down in several outstanding
minority feature films like Tian Zhuangzhuang 田另士另士's Daoumzei 盜 馬 賊 （
The/Jorse
TM的 （
1985) and Zhang Nuanxin 張 暖 衍 ，s QingchuzyY青 春 祭 （Sacrifee o f Fout/i)
(1985), and is even more absent in later ethnographic tales.26Likewise, the de-historicized,
atemporal representations of peripheral cultures that are still characteristic of most
root-searching narratives are now being abandoned in favour of more flexible attempts
to come to terms with the problem atique of a simultaneous presence of new and old
25 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982).
26 On The Horse Thief, see Dru Gladney, "Tian Zhuangzhuang, the Fifth Generation, and Minorities Film in China," 4
October 2003 < www.hawaii.edu/dru/horsethief.htm>; on Sacrifice ofYouth, see Gladey, "Representing Nationality in
China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities," 4 October 2003 <www,hawaii/dru/exotic.htm>.

disintegrating tendencies in contemporary "national" country life.

Blurred Boundaries, Precarious Transgressions

^

In Zhang Nuanxin's movie, the young heroine arrives in a remote southern D a i#
community as a Han stranger, but soon changes her clothes to dress in the fashion of
a Dai girl. Her new dress code clearly signifies a development in her concept of identity.
Accordingly, the story's climax positions her in a triangle of love, where she is con
fronted with having to choose between an educated Han and a peasant Dai man. Her
decision to leave both of them behind and take a teacher's job in a rural elementary
school mirrors her newly acquired non-identity: neither the plain, liberally sensuous
Dai lifestyle that is constantly threatened by the forces of nature, nor the superiorminded Han culture, which demands from all of its subjects a high degree of submis
sion to a relentlessly disciplining state power, can win her over. Much has been said
about the statist Han ideology of the beautiful naked minority woman that seemingly
is also permeating this movie; however, in this case the discourse is employed as a
vehicle to make a reverse statement. Ethnic otherness is represented here as equal, if
not 一 in certain respects — superior to Han culture. Therefore, it must not be
disciplined, but rather properly negotiated in a truly multi-ethnic nation. If there are
no categories for cross-cultural negotiation yet， as in the main protagonist’s case， the
experience of cultural difference at least causes a thorough and critical revision of
Han values. This message appears to be outstandingly daring in that epoch's cinemato
graphic and literary fields. But Tian Zhuangzhuang, with his movie The H orse Thief,
has launched an even more radical attack on Han elitism. As he himself has once
informed, the young Tibetan, who is a not only a horse thief, but also a devoted son,
husband and father, as well as an outstandingly capable member of the community,272
8
falls victim to his people's fear of the gods. This makes him a signifier of the victims
of the Cultural Revolution that had sacrificed innumerable subjects of the Chinese
27 Here, my argument takes a distinctly different direction from Gladney's. I am not sure whether Gladney has seen
another version of the film, or simply disregards the non-discursive messages of the movie, but this problem
deserves further reflection elsewhere. For the general line of this discussion, I am very indebted to Gladney's
readings of the Chinese minority films,
28 Karsten Kruger, Exotische Landschaften und ethnische Grenzzonen — Die Nationalen Minderheiten (shaoshu
minzu) Chinas im Film. Zur Probiematik fiimischer Reprasentations — und Authetizitatsstrategien am Beispiel des
fruhen chinesischen ethnographischert Dokumentarfilms [Exotic Landscapes and Ethinc Grey Areas — National
Minorities in Chinese Film, Concerning the Problem o f Cinematic Strategies for Representation — and Authenticity
in Early Chinese Ethnographic Documentary Films] (1 9 5 7 -1 9 6 6 ), (Frankfurt/M. & London: IKO Verlag fur
Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 2003),

nation to equally irrational moral principles. In terms of style, the movie parodistically
alludes to the genre of the Maoist documentary film that had flourished during the
60s. Those earlier films, in an ideologically overdetermined way, had set out to inform
the (Han) masses about the backwardness and primitiveness of their not yet liberated
brothers and sisters out there. While they， like the minority movies of the 80s， had
promoted ethnic exoticism by stressing the most gruesome, irrational and grotesque
aspects of the cultures at the margins,28they had done it for quite different reasons, as
the movies of the 80s argue for an inclusion based on the acknowledgement of cul
tural alterities, and not for a politics of surmounting them through homogenization
(which means Hanification).
Tian, by drawing his daring analogy between the barbarisms of primitive
survival and civilized modernity, has implemented a strategy of blurred bound
aries that questions many long-cherished convictions, such as the superiority of
rational, analytical modes of thinking, our capability o f moral judgment, or the
objectivity of the ethnographer's gaze. A t the same time, his movie forces global
viewers into an awkward position. Because this kind of analogical perception al
lows an opening of the scenario far beyond the Han-Zang site, we, as media spec
tators of historical events like the Cultural Revolution, are equally addressed. In
fact, we are invited to look back and question the realism o f our own strategies of
reality perception. It is in this context that the much-disputed concept of orientalism
can be quite helpful: Far from simply being the result of an attitude of uneasy
disguise and search for the legitimization o f oppressive colonial politics, it can be
consciously and actively employed by critical storytellers as a symbolic commit
ment that unveils the purpose and ideological foundations of beautiful, elaborate
cultural performances. This argument contains a defence of movies that have been
critically singled out for consumerist self-orientalism, like Zhang Yimou's Da hong
大 紅 燈 蘢 高 高 掛 CRaise t h e L a n t e r n ) or Jucfou 菊 豆 ，on
the grounds o f their engagement with the unquestionable facticity o f locally spe
cific form s of violence that experience continuous legitimization and enactment
through cultural practice. A s we all, as media spectators, get more and more ex
posed to visual images of the various, locally specific barbarisms, we for once
experience true globalism in a shared crisis of orientation. Whether or not audi
ences react to the orientalist appeal, step out of the vicious circle of self-congratu
latory habits and, instead of simply gazing at the primitivity of the represented
others with lecherous contempt, identify b y drawing their own analogies, is not (or
no longer) predominantly the storytellers' business.

Vexed Voices of Concern: The Question of Meaning in Ethnic Representations
The complexity of daily life is rapidly increasing in our age of virtual, or hyper
reality (as described by media theorists like Baudrillard, Virilio, and others), and, to
gether with this uncanny growth, its global, deterritorialized cultural forms and our
theorizing efforts tend to become more and more precarious. The fallacies, surprises
and latent possibilities of intercultural communication can best be seen in a debate on
recent Tibetan history between two concerned intellectuals of differently hyphenated
cultural backgrounds. In spring 2002, the Chinese dissident writer Wang Lixiong 王力
published his interpretation of a case of blurred boundaries in Sino-Tibetan his
tory that so far had been carefully avoided by both Chinese and Tibetan historians.
With a careful analysis he hoped to shed light on the cultural questions at stake,

[when] at the height o f the Cultural Revolution hundreds of thousands of Tibet
ans turned upon the temples they had treasured for centuries and tore them to
pieces, rejected their religion and became zealous followers of the Great Han
occupier, Mao Zedong. To the Chinese Communist Party, the episode is part o f a
social catastrophe — one that it initiated but has long since disowned and which,
it hopes, the rest of the world will soon forget. For the Tibetan participants, the
memory o f that onslaught is a bitter humiliation, one they would rather not talk
about, or which they try to exorcise with the excuse that they only did it "under
pressure from the Han .'1 Foreign critics simply refuse to accept that the episode
ever took place, unable to imagine that the Tibetans could willingly and consciously
have done such a thing .29

By applying what he considered to be objective criteria in his project of excava
tion of a secret history, Wang found three paradigms to explain the phenomenon and
its unfavourable effects on contemporary Tibetan society. First, the traditional Tibetan
society's strong fear of the gods (for which he believes he has found good reasons),
second, the local religious belief in a rotation of the gods, and third, the post-Maoist
politics of Tibetanization as a strategy o f redressing the wrongs. Their harsh natural
environment, Wang argues, forced Tibetans into a strong belief in fate, which was
seen as determined by occasionally rotating divine powers. Thus, Mao came to be seen
as successor to a previous incarnation o f a very powerful god, that is, as a victorious
concurrent of the Dalai Lama. This logic， Wang believes， explains why Tibetans will
29 Wang Lixiong, "Reflections on Tibet," A/eiA//.e^/?e\//evi/14 March-April 2 002,3 August Z003 < www.newieftreview.
net/NLR24805.html>.

ingly tore down Buddhist temples and rebuilt them as shrines to Mao and the victori
ous god he impersonated. When the Party later decided to turn away from its politics
of forcible secularization and even actively supported the restoration of temples that
it had destroyed before, it meant an admission of charismatic weakness, which in turn
reinforced the religious zeal of the Tibetans who now found themselves guilty of blas
phemy and made every effort to appease their temporarily abandoned gods.
In summer 2002, the native Tibetan Tsering Shakya, currently Research Fellow
in Tibetan Studies at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, retorted that
Wang's ideas are spurred less by a desire to understand Tibetan history and culture
and to help stabilize its contemporary society, than by a deeply internalized colonialist
attitude of the Chinese intelligentsia, who cannot imagine Tibetans otherwise than
servile and stupid. Since Chinese revolutionaries did not even understand their own
religious attitudes towards Mao and the revolution, he went on, they of course were
even less prepared to understand the agenda behind the destructive energy of Tibet
ans who were supervised by armed Red Guards. Had those Tibetans at that moment
been given a voice to utter their genuine feelings, their reports would have sounded
very different from what either Red Guards or Wang Lixiong imagined them to be. It
looks like the failure of Wang Lixiong's well-intentioned hermeneutic effort is in line
with the Chinese literary critic Wang Fei's attempt to understand the strange Tibetan
tales of the Sino-Tibetan author Zhaxi Dawa that were written between 1986 and 1990—
tales that he felt attracted to but apparently did not find appropriate categories to
theorize about. His interpretation of the tale that lent the title to Zhaxi Dawa's anthology,
说 n私 yfnm_sufyx记 西 藏 ，隱 秘 歲 月 （
Tibet, The Hidden CixTOJik:)， which he underX!•
stands as a eulogy of the modernizing spirit o f the Tibetan people, in particular shows
disturbing inconsistencies with the narrative logic of the tale proper. A s Wang Fei
tries to explain away these inconsistencies by alluding to a stereotypically mysterious
Tibet, his error mirrors what Tsering Shakya has to say o f Wang Lixiong's
misperception, since by doing so Wang Fei seems to assume that, if there are any
deficiencies of logic, they must necessarily reside in the Tibetan authors text, but not
in his own reading of it.30The critic may very well have overlooked the possibility that
the mystery has been created more by his particular type of hermeneutics (and the
historical formation of the discourse of a radically mysterious Tibet), than by the
alien country or the storyteller himself.
The solution to such fallible conceptualization seems to lie in contesting, multigeneric representations of events and contexts that can be analysed in a cross-cultural
30 Zhaxi Dawa, Xizangyinmi suiyue (Wuhan: Chancyiang wenyi chubanshe, 1993).

as well as interdisciplinary dialogue. Contrary to the historian or ethnographer, writ
ers and filmmakers, in their function as narrators of fictional stories, do not usually
tell, or claim to tell, what is true, but what is probable. In their narration, they do not
search for the most straightforward way to make their argument， but very often use
equivocal symbols. Since the 90s, they moreover consciously withdraw from the posi
tion of the knowledgeable narrator, and especially do not claim to be their rural or
ethnic protagonists1pedagogical guides. Rather, they have become aware o f the inde
pendence of all represented worlds from their own culturally conditioned experiential
horizon and what they and their readers may perceive as reality. Many contemporary
cultural producers have therefore given up the claim of authority over their cre
ation—
— like Yu Hua

who once said that, while writing, he always needs to listen

to what his protagonists want to say, and that he always needs to be careful to follow
their 〇"wn ideas about events.31 What these storytellers produce is， in other words, a
kind of simulated ethnographic fieldwork. Conducted in the fictional realm, their en
gagement with literary anthropology may enable us to get a clearer concept about the
ways in which people/others make meaning within their personal experiential realms,
and how they rearrange their cultural heritage in order to solve new problems. Like
Mira Nair’s fiction camera， Chinese narrators — whether cinematographic or literary —
since the 80s have embarked on a large-scale exploration of the fictional constructs of
those who dwell on the fringes of society. I suggest that this is not primarily because
they s仕ive to reassure themselves about their own central position and superiority，
but rather because those other agents/subjectivities, who have remained voiceless even
under the light of the scientific ethnographers' documentary gaze, need their creative
support in order to finally gain a voice of their own. "I felt that a fiction camera could
get into these otherwise out of bounds spaces much, much better than a hidden cam
era would," commented woman cinematographer Mira Nair some time ago.32

Conclusion
In a way, the new fictional ethnographic inquiry can be seen as a strategy of
class empowerment. Those post-Maoist intellectuals who found themselves relegated
to a class of subaltern subjects by Mao, now understandably do not continue to teach,
but rather form (imaginary) allies with the nation's traditional subaltern groups, which
include women, children, minority people and poor peasants. In their representations,
31 My unpublished interview with Yu Hua in summer 1999.
32 Gwendolyn Audrey Foster, Women Filmmakers o f the African and Asian Diaspora. Decolonizing the Gaze,
Locating Subjectivities (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997) 119,

they prefer to write back so as to defy exclusive Party authority and the paradigm of
national homogeneity. That this is not the only, arguably not even the most important
agenda, can be derived from a contextualized reading of Zhang Yimou's national epos
Yingxiong

(Hero) in the hermeneutic frame of minority discourse. While in his

1999 movie Y ^e dou bu

shao — 個 都 不 能 少 （iVot One Less)， the hero had been a

little peasant girl who was outstandingly successful where much more powerful adults
had failed, namely in bringing modernization and economic capital into her village,
Hero once again is a representation of the most refined and morally exemplary cul
tural elite of the nation. However, the protagonists are shown in the end to unite in a
public rite of self-annihilation in order to admonish, and simultaneously support, the
state authorities. While the minority discourse — as has been argued above — in a
new, and dangerously apolitical layer of meaning is now being used by Han officials to
sell the nation to foreign tourists,33and the traditional national vernaculars of the cul
tural borderline between north and south, or Qin ^-and Chu

once again engage in

open confrontation, concerned intellectuals raise their voices to warn about increas
ingly harmful forms of fragmentation and warlordism in the provinces.34 Meanwhile,
the storytellers' fiction camera wanders about looking for a foundation of the house of
China's peoples that can be more solid than ideology, power or money. In their view, it
is not enough for their aesthetic production to provide vernaculars for the deconstruction
of empty, legitimizing discourses and the concrete agonies of the nation's traumatized
subjects. If China wants to develop a modern society, its out-of-bound spaces and actors must be fully recognized as participant players in their own rights. Hopefully,
their soft revolution of poetic paradigms will persuade the political players to trans
late them into social reality.

33 Todd Munson, "Selling China: www.cnta.com and Cultural Nationalism," 10 April 2003 <www,albany,edu/jmmh/
vol2no1/chinaweb,html>.
34 Susan Blum and Lionel Jensen, eds, China Off Center, Mapping the Margins o f the Middle Kingdom (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2002).

